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UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CREDIT CARDS AND SOME
RELATED QUESTIONS: WHAT PROBLEMS REMAIN?
As a society and its commerce become more complex, unique legal
problems often arise. Courts are often able to find solutions to those
problems by simply extending existing law by analogy; in some
instances, however, the problems posed are so different that existing
law does not offer sufficient answers. When this occurs, the courts and
legislatures are called upon to establish and mold a body of law
which will sufficiently answer the peculiar problems that have been
posed. Credit cards create problems of just such a nature. In fact,
one writer has stated, "[tihe credit card holder is in a class by himself;
he does not belong with any group heretofore recognized in the com-
mon law."' This comment is an analysis of how the law has met and
dealt with unauthorized use of credit cards and the related problem
of the defenses a holder2 of a card may assert against the issuer.3
More particularly, it will include a discussion of the cases and legisla-
tion that have attempted to solve these problems, the issues that have
been left unanswered, and the problems, if any, that will result from
these judicial and legislative solutions.
4
Litigation involving unauthorized use of credit cards had its
origin in 19155 when a court was first asked to charge the holder for
purchases made with his lost credit token.6 The Pennsylvania Court,
faced with a new instrument of credit, looked to the old law of
negotiable instruments for an answer to a novel legal question. It
determined that the holder should in fact be held liable regardless of
I Dazell, Credit Card Law, 2 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 43, 53 (1970).
2 The term "holder" or "cardholder" in the context of credit cards is the person
in whose name a card is issued.
3 The issuer is the bank that provided the card and to whom payments are
sent. See text accompanying notes 26-39 infra.
4 To sufficiently analyze these problems and to help the attorney who may
represent any of the parties involved in a credit card transaction, a general dis-
cussion of the credit card industry along with its social and economic implications
is included below. Naturally, emphasis is given to the effect of 15 U.S.C. § 1643
(1970), which limits the liability of the holder of a credit card for unauthorized
use thereof.
G See Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).
6 In Wanamaker the court was dealing with a credit coin. Although this coin
was a simple two-party device, its use marked the begiming of an era in which
credit devices grew rapidly in use (see infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text)
and complexity (see infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text). In fact, as sug-
gested below, there have been predictions that our society may someday
substantially rely on credit cards for all retail transactions. See, e.g., Barnes,
The Law, The Credit Card and the Coming of the Checkless Society, 6 Am.
Bus. L.J. 641 (1968); Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit
to Modern Bank Card Systems, 18 KAN. L. REv. 871, 872-73 & n.20 (1970).
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any negligence on the part of the issuer.7 Shortly thereafter, however,
courts and lawyers realized they were facing a unique legal problem
which could not be sufficiently explained by the existing law of
negotiable instruments." It was not until later that a court was willing
to recognize that a duty to exercise due care should rest on both the
merchant and consumer.9 Questions regarding the duty of the merchant
and the issuer have appeared in most of the later cases; 10 in fact, the
basis of this legal duty and the degree of care it requires have been
the source of most of the litigation regarding the question of who
should be held liable for unauthorized use of credit cards."1 Imputing
liability for unauthorized use of credit cards has become a greater
problem, partly because the relatively simple credit token of the
early 1900's, which involved only two parties, has evolved into a much
broader tripartite agreement.12 In this newer three-party agreement an
issuer has been added to a transaction which previously involved only
7 Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).
8 See, e.g., Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 36 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1931); Lit Bros. v.
Haines, 121 A. 131 (N.J. 1923); see also Comment, Credit Cards-A Survey of the
Bank Card Revolution and Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 DE
PAUL L. REv. 389, 401 (1967); Comment, Sales: Credit Card Holder Liability for
Unauthorized Purchases, 20 OKLA. L. RFv. 219, 220 (1967). 50 Am. Jur. 2d Let-
ters of Credit § 38, at 428-29 (1970) states:
From a legal standpoint, credit cards or their predecessors have been
variously defined as, or held to be, negotiable instruments, mere identi-
fication cards, broad contracts of guaranty assignments, third-party
beneficiary contracts, or special, clean, revocable letters of credit. (foot-
notes omitted).
9 See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. of Lancaster Co.
1935), where the court held that since the holder was negligent in failing to notify
the issuer, the holder would have to be responsible for the unauthorized use.
10 See, e.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 186 S.W.2d 790 (Ark.
1945); Rayor v. Affiliated Credit Bureau, Inc., 455 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1969); Thomas
v. Central Charge Service, Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965); Socony
Mobile Oil Co. v. Greif, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522 (App. Div. 1960); Texaco, Inc. v.
Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App.
Div. 1963); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1969); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
11 For an examination of whether the holder or issuer should be held liable
see infra notes 40-84 and accompanying text.
12 Asthe credit card agreement progressed it went through several stages.
First, the credit tokens were replaced by cards which would be accepted by one
or only a few merchants. These cards found wider use as petroleum companies
adopted them. With national use, the collection of bills was centralized. However,
more complexity was to come as independent groups began to issue credit cards,
and thus evolved the true tripartite credit device. Of course, when the cards
expanded from two to three parties the credit card became even more unique in
a legal sense. For a thorough discussion of this progression see, e.g., Cooper, The
Bank Credit Card Revolution and Articles 4 and .5, 24 Bus. L&w. 133, 133-34
(1968); Dalzell, supra note 1, at 43-44; Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 459-63 (1960); Comment,
Credit Cards, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 207, 207-08 (1962).
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a holder and merchant. With this change the party issuing the credit
card has become more remote from the holder.13
An Overview of the Historical Development of Credit Cards
Bank cards originated in the early 1950's,14 but at first were
restricted to regional use. Shortly thereafter, there was a phenomenal
growth in both the number and use of bank cards.' 5 Along with this
growth, problems arose from credit card transactions and pressure de-
veloped to find better rules to answer the unique legal issues presented.,
In 1966, Bank Americard became the first bank card system to
expand its regional operations to the national level; 17 at a later time
it became international in scope.' 8 Interbank Card, Midwest Bank
Card, and Master Charge, observing the success with which national
bank cards were being greeted, as evidenced by the explosive growth
of Bank Americard, formed the Interbank Card system.19 By late 1973,
more than 35 million consumers carried bank cards.2 0 In 1968, bank
cards had outstanding credit of about one billion dollars;2 ' and the
loss from unauthorized use was estimated at $100,000,000 (as com-
pared to only $20,000,000 in 1966).22 By 1972 bank cards had out-
standing credit of about $4.5 billion,23 and the outstanding credit of
all types of credit cards had risen to over $9.7 billion.2 4 In fact, there
have been predictions by some bankers that retail sales may eventually
become substantially cashless.25
13 See Comment, Sales: Credit Card Holder's Liability for Unauthorized Pur-
chases, supra note 8, at 220-21.
'4 See Busmsss WEEK, Jan. 13, 1968, at 64; Comment, The Applicability of the
Law of Letters of Credit to Moder Bank Card Systems, supra note 6, at 871.
11All sources agree that the growth of the credit card industry has been ex-
ceptional, with one writer going so tr as to call it a "revolution." See Cooper, supra
note 12. See generally Williams v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. Cal.
1961); Facts About National Bank Americard, at 8 (Distr. by Natl Bank Ameri-
card, July, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Facts About National BankAmericard];
Toward a Cashless Society, Tim, Nov. 5, 1965, at 97a. Note, Bank Credit Plans:
Innovations in Consumer Financing, 1 LoYoLA U. oF L.A.L. REV. 49 (1968).
16 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
17Facts About National BankAmericard, at 7.
18Trm, July 12, 1968, at 66.
19 See Comment, The Applicabilfty of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modern
Bank Card Systems, supra note 6, at 872.2 0 Facts About National Bank-Americard, at 8.
21 BrisiN_-ss W_, Dec. 7, 1968, at 53.
22Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1969, at 19, col. 2.
23A Data Stripe Puts Speed in Credit Cards, Busuqmss WEEK, Sept. 16, 1972,
at 68.
24 Id.
2 5 See, e.g., Towards a Cashless Society, supra note 15; The Applicability of
the Law of Letters of Credit to Modern Bank Card Systems, supra note 6, at 873
n.20.
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Functioning of Bank Card Systems
The tripartite credit card clearly has an important place in
today's economy, but to appreciate the legal implications of this device,
a basic understanding of the mechanics of the bank card systems
is essential.26 The several bank card organizations are fundamentally
similar in their operations. 27 An originating bank28 chooses central
banks (also referred to as "Class A" banks) 2D throughout the country.
Each Class A bank coordinates all that system's operations within its
designated territory; this includes serving as a billing office for charges
made within that area, clearing charges made on cards issued by
other central banks, and approving applications of consumers who
wish to use the card and merchants who desire to accept such cards.30
Class A banks deal with any problems resulting from authorized use; in
addition, they suffer any loss not absorbed by holders or merchants. A
merchant must agree to accept all valid cards issued by a particular sys-
tem before a Class A bank will accept his application.3 ' After a bank is
chosen to be a Class A bank, it may designate other banks in its assigned
geographical region as member or "Class B" banks. Class B banks, like
Class A banks, may handle merchant accounts32 and display the bank
26 This information regarding how a bank-card system functions was obtained
in an interview with Mr. Jim Grant, Assistant Vice President, BankAmericard Dept.
of First Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., in Lexington, Kentucky, Sept. 5, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Interview, Sept. 5, 1973].2 7 Interview, Sept. 5, 1973.
2s An originating bank is that bank or group which started or presently makes
up the operating nucleus of the system. There is, of course, only one for each
system, so they delegate a great deal of authority and responsibility to other banks
in the system.
29 In the BankAmericard system, for example, there were 251 Class A members
as of June 30, 1973. Facts About National BankAmericard, at 3.
30 Id.
31 Each merchant is required to sign a detailed agreement with the issuer
which sets forth the duties of the merchant. For a copy of such an agreement see
Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Va aARso
L. REv. 218, 248-51 (1967). These merchant-issuer agreements have been the
source of little, if any, trouble in the past. However, as the legislature has severely
restricted agreements between issuers and holders (see 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970)),
these merchant-issuer contracts may be forced to allocate the burden for losses
that may have been on the holder in the past. Certainly, if this happens, they will
receive much greater legal scrutiny. Nevertheless, because the bargaining power
in issuer-merchant contracts is not particularly one-sided and since consumer ad-
vocates will not support either side, such agreements will probably be allowed;
they more closely carry out the intent of the parties than did the court and legis-
lature-restricted issuer-holder agreements. See infra notes 51-80 and accompanying
text.
32 Interview, Sept. 5, 1973. Each merchant participating in a bank-card
system is required to keep an account in a member bank within that system. His
account is credited (less a small discount) when he turns in his sales forms each
day. The merchant may withdraw from this account as long as he keeps it above a
certain level. After the merchant turns in the sales receipts they are sent to a
(Continued on next page)
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card symbol, but they operate under the authority of a Class A bank.33
It is obvious that this system is designed to expedite administrative
matters-not to prevent unauthorized use of credit cards. Integrated
into the system, however, are means which are intended to reduce
loss from unauthorized use of credit cards. Among the measures
designed to prevent and minimize misuse are "floor limits", 34 "hot-card
lists" 35 "expiration dates",3 6 and "credit lines".3 7 In the near future,
even more innovative measures will probably be used-including pic-
tures on cards38 and computer identification of signatures or finger-
prints. As banks suffer more losses from unauthorized use, they will
be forced to develop more effective ways to reduce these expenses;
and it is possible that they may eventually be able to eliminate such
loss.
3 9
Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards Prior to 1970
The scarcity of litigation involving unauthorized use of credit
cards has been attributed to the fact that, "because of bad publicity,
credit card issuers do not normally sue their cardholders whose
cards have been lost or stolen and subsequently used by a thief to
purchase merchandise."40 This is certainly one of the reasons why
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Class A bank, which then bills the cardholder. See Facts About National Bank-
Americard, at 4-5; Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to
Modern Bank Card Systems, supra note 6, at 873-75.
33 Interview, Se ?t. 5, 1973.
34 A "floor limit is the maximum amount that a merchant can sell by the use
of a credit card without calling the issuer for verification. The call and consequent
delay should discourage some fraudulent users from making large purchases. The
system also helps compensate for the delay in listing lost cards on a "hot-card list".
Interview, Sept. 5, 1973. For an explanation of "hot-card list", see infra note 35.
36 A 'hot-card list" is a list of numbers that reflects reported lost and stolen
cards. It is interesting to note that if an issuer puts a wrong number on these
lists, the person with that number may have a cause for libel or breach of con-
tract against the issuer. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1383 (1972).
36 "Expiration dates" are used so that a card, not reported lost or stolen, will
eventually become invalid on its own. Of course, the date is printed on the credit
card to call its invalidity to the attention of a merchant.
37 A "credit line" is a maximum that a cardholder can owe the issuer at any
time. The amount is adjusted to keep in line with the needs and experience of a
holder. Facts About National BankAmericard, at 6. Certainly, these limits are used
to prevent loss due to insolvent holders, but they also serve to put a limit on the
amount of unauthorized purchases that can be made on any card.
38 One writer suggests that photographs on cards would be an economical way
to prevent much unauthorized use and that the cost of such a project could be
limited to $.30 per card if holders provided the photographs. Murray, A Legal-
Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MrLA. L. REV.
811, 837 (1967). Some issuers are beginning to provide cardholders with cards
bearing their photograph if the holder will come into a Class A bank and have
his picture taken. Interview, Sept. 5, 1973.39 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 38, at 837; Comment, Bank Credit Cards-
Contemporary Problems, 41 FoanDHA L. REv. 373, 390-91 (1972).4 0 Comment, Credit Cards-A Survey of the Bank Card Revolution and Ap-
plicability of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 8, at 400.
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there have been few cases involving misuse of credit cards. Since the
cases to be discussed cover a period of time from 191541 until 1972'
and because they are in conflict, it is impossible to draw any legal
principles from them without some qualification. For this reason, the
actual holdings of the courts in dealing with unauthorized use of
credit cards will be surveyed first, followed by a discussion of some
general principles which may be applicable today.
Basically, the case law developed around two categories of prob-
lems. In the early cases, the courts were faced with situations in
which the liability for misuse was not contractually allocated; in most
of the later cases43 there has been a clause44 in the contract which
established who was to be held liable in the event of unauthorized
use. Since almost all modern cases involve risk-allocation clauses,
the importance of earlier cases, resolved without the benefit of such
clauses, rests not on the precise holdings of such cases, but rather
on the soundness of their reasoning and their value as precedent for
courts in interpreting risk-distribution contracts. 45 Generally, the
courts have taken three views in noncontractual allocation of liability
cases. In Wanamaker v. Magery,46 a Pennsylvania court reasoned
that since the holder makes the loss possible, he should be responsible
for the consequences. Wanamaker was a very early case in which the
court found authority for its decision in the law of negotiable instru-
ments.47 Several years later, in Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnick,48 another
Pennsylvania court took the view that each party had at least an im-
plied duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care and that the court
should engage in a balancing of responsibilities. The third view,
appearing in certain later cases, 49 is that the issuer should have to bear
the burden regardless of the holder's negligence.50
41 Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).42 See, e.g., Green v. First Nat'l Bank, 272 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1972); Am. Nat'l
Bank v. Rathburn, 264 So. 2d 360 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
43 Clearly, most cases that would be litigated today would involve a risk-
allocation clause. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970); 23 WAsH. & LF L. REV. 125,
128 (1966).
44 These clauses, of course, vary a great deal, and some had even limited the
cardholder's liability prior to the 1970 statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970). For a
typical clause see text accompanying note 57 infra.
45 One should note that the subject of risk-allocation clauses is now controlled
to a large extent by 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970). See text accompanying notes 94-99
infra.
4624 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915).
471d. at 779. See also Comment, The Lost Credit Card: The Liability of the
Parties, 30 ALBANY L.J. 79, 80 (1966).
48 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. of Lancaster Co. 1935).
49 Thomas v Central Charge, Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
50 These holdings may look severe at first glance; however, the issuer is in the
best position to absorb, administer, and distribute loss from unauthorized use. See
_(Continued on next page)
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The most significant cases, as previously stated, involve contracts
in which an issuer has attempted to either minimize or eliminate any
loss where a card has been improperly used. Clearly, if a risk-allocation
clause is to impose liability on a holder, there must have been a
manifestation of acceptance of the terms.51 Generally, this only re-
quires that the terms in the printed contract would have been seen
by a reasonable man.52 After establishing the existence of a contract,
courts dealing with these cases have either read the clauses strictly
and literally53 or have loosely interpreted them and placed duties of
good faith and diligence on issuers and merchants.54 Hence, the
courts are widely split on the issue of liability where there is a con-
tract.55
The approach which reads the contract clauses strictly is well
illustrated by the case of Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein.5 6 In that case, the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1423-28 (1968).
It should also be noted that Thomas was litigated in a period of growing consumer
protection, in which issuers had been contractually minimizing their losses as much
as possible.51 See 3 A. CoaiNn, CoNTRACrs § 607 (rev. ed. 1960). 1 S. Wnj. LoN, CON-
TRAcTs § 90 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTONI.
52 See Wu..isToN § 90 c.
53 See Mobile Oil Corp. v. Evans Glove Co., 303 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Uni-Serve Corp. v. Vitiello, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Texaco,
Inc. v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
54 See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 186 S.W.2d 790 (Ark. 1945);
Rayor v. Affiliated Credit Bureau, Inc., 455 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1969); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Waters, 159 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Allied Stores, Inc. v.
Funderburke, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 349 P.2d
243 (Ore. 1960).
55 Most writers recognize that the jurisdictions are split in their interpretation
of risk-allocation clauses. See, e.g., Dazell, supra note 1, at 46; Comment, The
Lost Credit Card: The Liability of the Parties, 30 ABAN-y L. BEv. 79, 85 (1966);
Comment, Contracts-Credit Card Liability Resulting From Unauthorized Use, 12
DE PAuL L. REv. 150, 151-54 (1962); Comment, Sales: Credit Card Holder's
Liability for Unauthorized Use, supra note 8, at 221; Comment, Credit Cards: The
Liability of the Card Holder for Unauthorized Purchases, supra note 43, at 128.
But see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1086 (1967), which seemingly attempts to recon-
cile these views.
All cases do not clearly take either view, but some attempt a compromise
between both. For instance, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521
(Tex. 1969), the Texas court held that although the consumer-defendant was not
negligent, the defendant, not the plaintiff, (who was both issuer and merchant)
could only escape liability for unauthorized purchases by -proving that Sears failed
to exercise due care. The court in Duke based its decision on the contract by
which Duke accepted liability for any purchases made on the credit card. Id. at
523. However, they held that if the defendant could bear the burden of proving
the issuer was negli ent, Sears would not be allowed to enforce the contract. Id. at
523-24. The basis for allocating the burden to Duke was that, "[iln general, and
subject to contrary areement by the parties, the one who can best control the
risk should assume it.' Id. at 523. The court fails to mention, however, why the
contract is not a "contrary agreement". Even so, there is validity in the argument
that the holder is in the best position to prevent misuse of the card.
56 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962).
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clause by which Texaco sought to hold Goldstein liable for unauthor-
ized purchases stated:
This credit card confirms the authorization of credit during the
period shown, to the person, corporation or firm whose name is
embossed on the reverse side thereof. Such person, corporation or
firm assumes full responsibility for all purchases made here-under
by anyone through the use of this credit card prior to surrendering
it to the company or to giving the company notice in writing that
the card has been lost or stolen. Retention of this card or use
thereof constitutes acceptance of all the terms and condition
thereof.
57
In Goldstein, the defendant's card was stolen and $569.98 in unau-
thorized charges were made before notice was given.58 The New
York Supreme Court found that the agreement was reasonable in
its statement allocating liability for unauthorized use.59 The court
went on to hold that Goldstein was liable and, regarding whether a
duty of due care rests upon the issuer, stated:
[ulnless actual notice of loss is given to the company, it can have
no way of knowing of such loss, and to require some thirty thousand
dealers to suspect the loss of any particular card and use diligence
against its abuse, is not within the requirements of plaintiff as the
issuer of the credit card.60
The court explained that the mere imprint of a credit card on an
invoice created a prima facie case for the issuer.61 Although this
approach could be extremely burdensome on a particular holder, it
does find support not only in the contract, but also in the theory that
a holder of a card is in the best position to prevent its unauthorized
use.
The opposing view allows the holder to avoid liability where certain
conditions, discussed below, are met. To accept this view a court
must find a reason not to enforce a well drafted contractual agree-
ment. 2 Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co. 63 is a typical case
which adopts the view that these contracts do not have to be literally
construed. Therein Gulf sued Williams Roofing Company, based on
a risk-allocation clause, for money allegedly due from purchases made
57Id. at 53.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 55.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 56.
62 Another possible legal basis for not holding the consumer liable, not found
in the case law, is the Uniform Commercial Code. See infra notes 76-84 and ac-
companying text.
63 186 S.W.2d 790 (Ark. 1945). See also cases in note 54 supra.
[Vol. 62.
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with a credit card issued to the defendant. Williams, notwithstanding
the contract, proved that the purchases were not made with its
permission; it proved, on the contrary, that the charges were made
with a stolen credit card on which an authorized name had been forged.
In fact, the court determined that the defendant had placed "Good
for Truck Only" 4 on the face of the card while all the purchases
were made by a man driving an automobile.6 5 As a result, the court
held that Gulf dealers were negligent and should not be able to
collect the $975.84 which represented the forged invoice.66  The
court also found several indications of bad faith on the part of Gulf's
dealers67 and that the defendant had given notice within a reasonable
time (although by then many of the purchases had already been
made). 68 Although the impact of these findings is not entirely clear,
the Arkansas court explicitly required not only that the issuer act in
good faith, but also that he exercise a reasonable degree of care.69
These requirements prevented the enforcement of a contract which
stated that the holder "assumes full responsibility for all merchandise,
deliveries, or services obtained by any person by its presentation."70
The result of the view represented by this case is that good faith
and reasonable care serve as conditions precedent to the existence of
any contractual rights. Although this line of cases71 may appear to
ignore the reasonable understanding of the parties as to the nature of
their agreement, 72 several lines of reasoning make this position quite
attractive to courts. First, the courts are reluctant to uphold agree-
ments where bargaining power is not evenly allocated.73 Moreover,
64 186 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Ark. 1945).
65 Id. at 792.
66 !d.
67 Id. at 792-93, where the court explains that some of the dealers knew the
forger, that several dealers had not correctly copied the forger's license plate num-
ber and that much of the merchandise could not have been used on the automobile
the forger was drivin . Of course, if one who fraudulantly uses a credit card is
found, he can be held liable in both civil and criminal actions. See 15 U.S.C. §
1644 (1970); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 986 (1969).
68 186 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Ark. 1945).
69 Id. at 795.
701d. at 794.
71 See supra note 54. For another case that very explicitly takes this view, see
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 349 P.2d 243 (Ore. 1960), which held that an issuer could
contractually limit his liability for unauthorized use only if he could bear the burden
of proving tat ordinary care was exercised to ascertain whether the person present-
ing the card had authority from the holder to do so.
72 These issuer-holder agreements are not in any sense ambiguously drawn;
therefore it is clear that had the parties read that part of the contract they would
have understood, as would any reasonable person, what it meant. See, e.g., text
accompanying note 70 supra.
7 See 6A A. CoaRnN, CoNrRAcrs § 1472 (rev. ed. 1962). See generally Com-
ment, Credit Cards: The Liability of the Card Holder for Unauthorized Purchases,
supra note 43, at 131.
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courts note the growing importance of consumer protection and the
fact that issuers and merchants are in a better position to absorb and
distribute any financial losses.74 Of course, by putting a duty to
exercise care on issuers and sellers it may be possible to encourage
action which will reduce the financial losses resulting from unauthor-
ized use of credit cards. 75
Where there has been a contract which imputed liability to the
holder, the courts, through an application of general equitable doc-
trines as in Gulf, have most often refused to hold the consumer
liable.76 Several commentators77 have suggested, however, that the
courts should look to the Uniform Commercial Code to ascertain
how best to solve credit card problems. These arguments have been
based on the close resemblance of the credit card to transactions
covered by the Code, such as letters of credit,78 assignments of instru-
ments, 79 and actions involving holders in due course.80 If all jurisdic-
dictions would apply the Code to credit card problems this would
provide uniformity, but it can be argued that since the Code does not
explicitly apply to credit card transactions, its use would be little more
than another attempt to fit a unique legal problem into established
patterns of the law.
81
On the other hand, there are persuasive arguments that the Code
should be applied to credit card transactions.8 2 It has been suggested
that since the purpose of letters of credit (i.e., to allow one person to
buy something from a merchant based on the credit of another) is the
same as the purpose of bank cards, Article Five of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code should apply, at least in bank card transactions. Also,
74 See supra note 50.
75 A duty on issuers may be particularly helpful. They are in an excellent po-
sition to minimize losses because an issuer is the only party who can establish more
effective means of identification. See, e.g., note 38 supra. Merchants, too, can help
prevent loss by careful checking of "hot-card lists" (see supra note 35) and by
following thorough identification procedures. Of course, in these situations the
merchant was the person who lost control of the credit card.
76 Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 186 S.W.2d 790 (Ark. 1945).
For a list of other cases see supra note 54.
77 See generally Cooper, supra note 12; Davenport, supra note 31; Comment,
Credit Cards-A Survey of the Bank Card Revolution and Applicability of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, supra note 8; Comment, The Applicability of the Law of
Letters of Credit to Modern Bank Card Systems, supra note 6.7 8 See UNFoRm CoMMErmCL CoDE art. 5 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
79 See U.C.C. § 9-206.
80 See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-805.
81 See, e.g., Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to
Modern Bank Card Systems, supra note 6, at 890.
82 Id. at 875.
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there is the argument 3 that the drafters of the Code implicitly dealt
with credit card use in Article Nine in which they stated:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers . . . . an agreement by a buyer . . . that he will not
assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller ... is enforceable by an assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a
claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder in due course .... 84
What Defenses May a Holder Assert Against an Issuer?
Regardless which part of the Uniform Commercial Code is best
fitted to handle credit card problems, its application would meet
strong objection by consumer advocates. Such objection would arise
because the Code, if applied without modification, would clearly
prevent the holder of a credit card from asserting defenses he has
against goods or a merchant in an action brought by the issuer of a
bank card.85 That is, a consumer is not ordinarily required to pay a
merchant for shortages or to the extent goods are faulty;8 6 however,
the courts have not decided whether a holder of a credit card can raise
such defenses against a remote issuer,87 and consumer advocates
would likely oppose the Code as long as these defenses may be valid
if the Code is not applied. It may, however, be possible to look to the
Code for guidance without depriving a holder of defenses he has
against the merchant. Although there is no law in the credit card field
dealing with goods-oriented defenses, there is some analogy to the
situation in which a financing institution loans money so that a con-
83 See Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary Problems, supra note 39,
at 382-83.
84 U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
85 See, e.g., Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary Problems, supra
note 39, at 383; Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to
Modern Bank Systems, supra note 6, at 887-88. One should also consider the effect
of a contractual agreement whereby a holder agrees not to assert any defenses he
has as to the goods against the issuer. Courts have upheld this type of agreement
by following general contract principles and the Uniform Commercial Code. See,
e.g., Root v. John Deere Co., 413 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1967). There have not been
any cases involving such clauses entered into by issuers and holders of credit cards.
However, if they were to be considered, the law regarding risk-allocation clauses
(see text accompanying notes 51-84 supra) would probably regain importance in
this analogous context.86 See generally U.C.C. § 2-602.
87 See, e.g., note 77 supra for a list of articles suggesting application of the
Code; however, none refer to any credit card case which has applied the Code. It is
interesting to note that Wanamaker v. Megary 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct.
1915), did apply the pre-Code law of negotiable instruments. See text accompany-
ing notes 45-50 supra.
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sumer may purchase particular goods. In these cases the courts
have sometimes denied recovery to the lending institution upon
default when goods were faulty, but liability has only been imputed
to the lender in this manner where he either knew or should have
known of a product's deficiency."' On its face it appears such results
could be achieved through the Codes "good faith" requirement, 9 but
the Code probably would not satisfy consumer advocates because the
"good faith" requirement would not likely be stretched to require an
issuer to determine whether any merchants who accepted his card
sold defective products.
It has also been suggested that a holder could base his argument
on the liability often imputed to one who advertises his approval of a
particular product which turns out to be defective.90 The argument that
a bank should have a duty to insure that merchants who accept their
cards do not sell defective products has a great deal of merit in the
sense that issuers would be encouraged to be selective in their choice
of participating merchants, thus encouraging merchants to sell better
products and equalizing the bargaining power between consumers
and merchants. Of course, consumer advocates would not want the
holder to have to prove fault on the part of the issuer, but only that
the merchant's product was faulty. However, to require the issuer to
investigate participating merchants could have the effect of limiting
merchant enrollment in the bank card system and make it necessary
for the banks to charge service fees. As a result many of the advantages
of bank cards would be undermined.9' Moreover, even the 'new
or should have known" test would leave the issuer in a precarcious
position in determining what he should know.
88 See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966). See Connor v. Great Western
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405(N.J. 1967).
89 See U.C.C. § 1-203.
90 Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary Problems, supra note 39, at
384-85.
91 One of the attractive features of bank cards as opposed to other tripartite
credit cards (e.g., American Express) is that one may use them without any
charge. Interview, Sept. 5, 1973.
George Mitchell, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, addressed the
problem of what defenses a holder may assert against an issuer. On September 12,
1972, he suggested to a group of bankers that a system should be established so
that issuers can respond to consumer complaints and that there should be a
remedy for a holder who buys faulty merchandise. See U.S. Nmvs A Wonw.
REPORTs, Sept. 25, 1973, at 70. Since most consumers would not be aware of
defenses they might be able to assert, it would also be helpful if this suggested
system could be used to inform consumers of their rights. Mr. Mitchell said that
a cardholder should be able to stop payment on his charges as he may with checks.
He further explained, however, that the problem is in the issuer-merchant
ageement (see supra note 31), which gives a holder no remedy outside of court.
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Questions regarding what defenses a holder may assert against an
issuer and what duties, if any, an issuer has to assure quality in a
merchant's product should require a delicate balancing of the factors
discussed above; it will be most interesting to see how they are
answered. As suggested, it would seem wise to allow these defenses
to be raised against the issuer who acts in bad faith and against the
negligent issuer, but the critical balancing will occur when a court
must determine whether a particular issuer should have known that a
merchant was selling a defective product. Since the issuer would have
a cause of action against the merchant if his action against the holder
was defeated because of the merchant's faulty product, banks may not
face a great dilemma. Furthermore, banks require participating mer-
chants to maintain a specific balance,92 and they could increase that
requirement for certain merchants and consider contractually requiring
participating merchants to insure payments not tendered because of
allegedly defective goods and to reimburse them for any expenses
reasonably incurred in their collection efforts.
93
1970 Amendments to the Truth-In-Lending Act
In the midst of confusion and uncertainty in the law regarding
unauthorized use of credit cards, a need for uniformity became readily
apparent. This uncertainty, along with a growing interest in consumer
protection, stimulated Congress in 1970 to amend the Truth-in-Lending
Act to include the following:
Liability of holder of credit card-
Limits on liability
(a) A cardholder shall be liable for unauthorized use of a
credit card only if the card is an accepted card, the liability is not
in excess of $50, the card issuer gives adequate notice to the card-
holder of the potential liability, the card issuer has provided the
cardholder with a self-addressed, prestamped notification to be
mailed by the cardholder in the event of the loss or theft of the
credit card, and the unauthorized use occurs before the card-
holder has notified the card issuer that an unauthorized use of the
credit card . . . may occur. . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing,
92 nterview, Sept. 5 1973.
03The crucial problem in dealing with issuer-merchant agreements is de-
termining how the courts would treat them. See supra notes 31 and 91. That is,
would they receive the close scrutiny that has been given to similar issuer-holder
contracts? See text accompanying notes 51-84 supra. There is the argument that
the issuer is in the best position to absorb, administer, and distribute loss resulting
from unauthorized use (see supra note 50); and this argument may apply equally
to the defective goods situation. On the other hand, as mentioned in note 31 supra,
because of the more equal bargaining power (see supra note 73) and lack of pres-
sure from consumer groups, it is unlikely that issuer-holder agreements would
meet the same degree of scrutiny encountered by contracts between issuers and
holders. See, e.g., supra note 54.
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. . .after the expiration of twelve months following such effective
date [90 days following enactment on Oct. 26, 1970], no card-
holder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of any credit card
regardless of the date of its issuance, unless (1) the conditions
of liability specified in the preceding sentence are met, and (2)
the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user of such
card can be identified as the person authorized to use it. For the
purposes of this section, a cardholder notifies a card issuer with
the pertinent information whether or not any particular... agent
of the card issuer does in fact receive such information.
Burden of proof
(b) ... [T]he burden of proof is upon the card issuer to show
that the use was authorized or, if the use was unauthorized,
• ..to show that the conditions set forth in subsection (a) ...
have been met.
Liability imposed by other laws or by agreement with the issuer
(c) Nothing in this section imposes liability upon a cardholder
for the unauthorized use of a credit card in excess of his liability
for such use under other applicable law or under any agreement
with the card issuer.
Exclusiveness of liability
(d) Except as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no
liability from unauthorized use of a credit card.
94
The statute is self explanatory; the issuer must bear the burden of
proving unauthorized use. Furthermore, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(d) (1970)
makes prior case law meaningless in those instances where liability
was apportioned in the absence of any contractual obligation on the
part of the holder to bear the burden of unauthorized purchases. 5 In
addition, even though "applicable law" is retained under part (c), it
has been limited to a minimal liability ($50). It may appear that
absolute liability should have been placed upon the issuer, but the $50
limit has several advantages. It offers at least some inducement to the
94 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970). Note that § 1643(c) makes the statute serve
only as a maximum limit; thus, stricter state laws are encouraged. For an ex-
amination of these state statutes see Weistart, Consumer Protection in the Credit
Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 MiCH. L. REv. 1475, 1538-43
(1972). If the laws are too strict, they do injustice to their purpose because they
will not encourage issuers to solicit the help of cardholders in developing measures
to minimize unauthorized use. See text accompanying notes 95-99 infra. Mr.
Weistart suggests that even the $50 maximum liability is not large enough to
encourage the dissemination of sufficient information to holders. Weistart, supra,
at 1508-09. However, it appears to this writer that issuers should inform their
holders of the $50 potential liability to discourage unauthorized use exceeding that
amount; in fact, most issuers do so inform their holders and meet the other
strict requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970). Interview, Sept. 5, 1973. There-
fore, it further appears that most issuers believe the $50 limit is sufficient to en-
courage holders to give notice.
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a),(d) (1970).
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holder to prevent his card from being stolen or lost. Also, to take
advantage of the $50 limit, issuers are forced to meet certain criteria
which should help minimize losses from unauthorized use. For ex-
ample, to meet these requirements and to reduce the chance of misuse,
issuers may provide a place for holders to sign the card. This is at
least a first step toward minimizing unauthorized use.
On the other hand, the statute appears to make the holder's duties
of good faith and due care that had previously existed in some cases96
less important, since banks were reluctant to sue even before there
was a minimum.97 This comprehensive statute has been made even
more complete by the Federal Reserve Board through Regulation Z
and through its "letter rulings". By the use of "letter rulings", the
Board has stated that irrespective of the number of times a card is
used without authorization, it was the intention of Congress to limit
the total liability of the holder to $50;98 and the Board has required
that notice of the $50 liability be plainly visible on each card.g9
What Problems Remain?
It is appropriate to discuss the problems this comprehensive
statute 00 has left to be dealt with by regulations and further statutes
and cases. The statute has virtually eliminated any necessity for courts
to further evaluate the efficacy of their past holdings regarding alloca-
tion of the burden for unauthorized purchases as between the holder
and issuer. However, these cases will still have some significance in
determining who should bear the burden of unauthorized use as
between the issuer and merchant. For policy reasons, if such a contest
were to arise it would probably be best to hold the issuer responsible
for any unauthorized use, unless the merchant was negligent or failed
to act in good faith-after all, the issuer is in the better position to
distribute any loss. One should also consider the possible outcome of a
case wherein a court is asked to ascertain the effectiveness of a contract
between a merchant and an issuer whereby the merchant agreed to
pay for any unauthorized purchases made at his place of business. In
96 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962);
Wanamaker v- Megary 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). But see Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 186 S.W.2d 790 (Ark. 1945).
07 "Because of a fear of bad publicity, credit card issuers do not normally
sue their cardholder wvhose cards have been lost or stolen and subsequently used
... to purchase merchandise." Comment, Credit Card-A Survey of the Bank Card
Revolution and Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 8, at
400. 98 See Truth-in-Lending-Special Releases-Correspondence, 4 CCH Consumer
Credit Guides 9 30,641 (1971).
99 Id. at II 30,772, at 66,839 (1971).
100 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
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this way the law regarding allocation of responsibility for unauthorized
use of credit cards remains important. Prior case law may, therefore,
apply by analogy and without regard to the $50 limit; however, the
court hopefully will be more consistent than in the past in their place-
ment of the burden and more logical in an evaluation of who is fairly
and best able to bear the burden.
Another problem left by 15 U.S.C. § 1643 is the determination of
whether it should protect only individual cardholders.101 Certainly the
original purpose of the act was not to protect corporate cardholders,
but only individuals. In fact, the Federal Reserve Board originally in-
terpreted the fraud provisions of the act as inapplicable to cards issued
in a company name. 10 2 However, the Board has apparently changed
its position and has amended Regulation Z to require application of
the act to all credit cards.103 As one writer explains, "[tlhe trend is
clearly toward imposing upon the issuer as heavy a burden as a
reasonable interpretation of Truth-in-Lending will allow."10 4
Probably the most important question left unanswered by the
statute is one which has always existed: What constitutes unauthorized
use of a credit card? It is clear that the burden is on the issuer to
show that the use was unauthorized. 0 5 In 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o), Con-
gress offers the following insight into what they meant by the term
"unauthorized use":
The term 'unauthorized use' . . means a use of a credit card
by a person other than the cardholder who does not have actual,
implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the
cardholder receives no benefit.106
This definition of unauthorized use, which follows general agency
principles,' 07 has also been explicitly adopted by the Federal Reserve
Board. 08 Reading it for its negative implication indicates that either
101 See Weistart, supra note 94, at 1513-18; Comment, Bank Credit Cards-
Contemporary Problems, supra note 39, at 392 n.110. One court has applied the
statutory limit to unauthorized use of a business credit card. See American Airlines,
Inc. v. Remis Indus., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSU R CaMrr
GuDE Uff 99, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). However, the Remis court did so by applying
New York law, not through an application of the federal statute. See supra note 94.
The case, thus, leaves in issue whether 15 U.S.C. § 1643 applies to business credit
cards.
'0 2 See 4 CCH CONSUmER CREDIT GUmE II 30,708 (1971); Am. Jur. 2d Con-
sumer Credit Protection § 7 (1973) (New Topic Service).
103 Federal Reserve Board Order of Aug. 3, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 16408
(1972).
104 Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary Problems, supra note 39, at
392 n.110.
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(b) (1970).
'
0 6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (1970).
107 See Weistart, supra note 94, at 1518.
lo8 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a) (7) (1973).
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authority or any benefit will cause the use to be deemed authorized. 10 9
This leads to some confusion because under the statute, if particular
charges are not authorized, the holder is not relieved of any liability.1 10
Although the statute and definitions are not clear with respect to
whether partial benefit absolutely renders a particular use authorized,
the better view would be to impute liability to the holder only to the
extent he benefits."1 Furthermore, this rule finds support in the law of
restitution. 112 Even without this problem, it is easy to envision com-
plicated litigation turning on the issue of whether a particular use was
authorized.
Another related and very important question is the degree of the
burden of proof that the statute requires an issuer to bear in order to
prove that a purchase is authorized. Because these remaining issues
are primarily ones of degree, they are best left to the courts; it is
important, however, that consistent and logical guidelines be adopted.
As suggested, these guidelines may be found in the statute, regulations,
and, to some degree, in the previous case law.
The situation in which the necessity to determine what constitutes
unauthorized use has typically arisen occurs where cards are issued
jointly to two holders or to one holder who puts his card into the
possession of his spouse. Under what circumstances will one holder
be liable for purchases made with the card by the other party? Where
marital difficulty occurs this type of problem is common. In an excel-
lent article dealing with 15 U.S.C. § 1643, with regard to the meaning
of "unauthorized use" in the family context, one author explains:
Many issuers apparently feel that a cardholder should be held
responsible for misuse of his card by anyone within his household.
Indeed, an issuers' association has suggested that the reference to
an absence of benefit in the definition of "unauthorized use" was
intended to exclude from the statute uses "by a member of the
family or household of the cardholder." [See Hearings on S. 721
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 156,
159 (1969) (statement of Midwest Bank Card System, Inc.)]
There is, however, no evidence that such misuses were intended to
be excluded as a class. The mere fact of a familial relationship
between cardholder and user does not suggest a basis for imposing
liability, and these cases should be treated under the same prin-
ciple that governs other applications of the statute. The cardholder
will be liable in many of these situations because the family
109 Weistart, supra note 94, at 1522-23.
110 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
111 Accord, Weistart, supra note 94, at 1522-25.
112 See generally Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request,
19 VAN. L. R v. 1183, 1198-99 (1966).
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member's use is accompanied by sufficient indicia of authority
to bind the cardholder. Other cases may present facts that justify
imposing full liability upon the cardholder, as where the unau-
thorized family user secures necessities that the cardholder might
have otherwise been obligated to provide. But these can be
dealt with under general agency and restitutory concepts, and do
not undermine the broad principle that the statute is not properly
read as giving rise to general cardholder liability upon mere
receipt of benefit."
3
In Socony Mobile Oil Co. v. Greif,114 a New York Court was faced
with the issue of whether a husband could be held responsible for pur-
chases made on his credit card by his estranged wife. The court, how-
ever, was able to avoid the question of exactly what constitutes un-
authorized use, because the husband-defendant had given notice to
Socony that he desired to cancel his credit card, but could not recover
it from his wife. The court refused to hold the defendant-holder liable.
When faced with a similar fact situation, another court reached the
contrary result and held the defendant liable. In Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. McMillan, 15 a holder had loaned his card to another person who
refused to return the card and, in fact, made unauthorized purchases.
No notice was given here, however;" 61 and one should further note
that McMillan is a 1943 case and therefore of questionable value in
the rapidly expanding field of credit card law. In both these cases it is
noteworthy that the courts placed a great deal of emphasis on notice,
even though the purchases might otherwise have been determined to
be "authorized." Although the two cases are somewhat dated, they
clearly make the point, of which the statute now requires all courts to
take cognizance, that, where there is notice that a card is no longer to
be honored, the issuer is responsible for all unauthorized purchases." 7
Moreover, as illustrated by the Greif case, notice is important in de-
termining whether there was authority-i.e., whether the purchases
were authorized. Because of the important role of notice, attorneys
should have their clients promptly inform the issuer in the event a
credit card is lost, stolen, or likely to be used by an estranged spouse
who no longer has permission to do so.118
113 Weistart, supra note 94, 1524-25 (footnotes omitted).
114 197 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523-24 (App. Div. 1960). Another case involving this'
husband-wife problem is American Nat l Bank v. Rathburn, 264 So. 2d 860, (La.
Ct. App. 1972), where the court would not impose liability on the holder unless
he had expressly or impliedly made his wife his agent.
"15 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
116 Id. at 882.
117 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970).
118 It may be possible for a court to hold a cardholder liable, even beyond the
$50 limit, if he acts in bad faith or in an extremely unreasonable manner in failing
(Continued on next page)
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Conclusion
Other important questions remain, such as what constitutes un-
authorized use where there is no notice, what defenses a holder may
assert against an issuer of a card, and how great a burden the courts
will place on issuers. In fact, the critical question that has existed
since the courts first dealt with credit cards is still not completely
answered-what law should apply to credit card transactions? 19
Certainly the $50 limit 20 on holder liability for unauthorized purchases
has reduced the impact of these problems, but they still exist and will
become more important as long as we continue to follow the path to a
"cashless society".'
21
11. David Lester
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to give notice. Before the statute was enacted, some courts applied the equitable
doctrine of estoppel to prevent a holder from asserting his defenses. See Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Consolidated Van & Storage Co., 192 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1960);
Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762 (La. 1962).
110 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
12 0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
121 This terminology is commonly used in describing the growing importance
of the credit card. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 6, at 641 n.1.
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